Loyola Consumer Law Review
Volume 6 | Issue 1

Article 10

1993

Debtors Cannot Reduce Mortgage to Fair Market
Value
Kathie Yoo

Follow this and additional works at: http://lawecommons.luc.edu/lclr
Part of the Consumer Protection Law Commons
Recommended Citation
Kathie Yoo Debtors Cannot Reduce Mortgage to Fair Market Value, 6 Loy. Consumer L. Rev. 27 (1993).
Available at: http://lawecommons.luc.edu/lclr/vol6/iss1/10

This Recent Case is brought to you for free and open access by LAW eCommons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Loyola Consumer Law Review
by an authorized administrator of LAW eCommons. For more information, please contact law-library@luc.edu.

Recent Cases
Debtors Cannot Reduce
Mortgage To Fair Market
Value
In Nobelman v. American Savings
Bank, 113 S.Ct. 2106 (1993), the United
States Supreme Court held that a bankruptcy debtor could not reduce an
undersecured homestead mortgage to
its fair market value by dividing the
mortgage into its secured and unsecured parts.
The Modified Repayment Plan
In 1984, American Savings Bank
(American) loaned Leonard and Harriet
Nobelman $68,250 for the purchase of
a condominium in Dallas, Texas. In
return, the bank received an adjustable
rate note which was secured by a deed
on the residence. In 1990, the
Nobelmans fell behind in their mortgage payments and sought relief under
Chapter 13 of the Bankruptcy Code.
During the bankruptcy proceedings,
American filed a proof of claim for
$71,335. This amount included the
principal, interest, and fees the
Nobelmans owed on their note. The
Nobelmans, on the other hand, proposed to make payments on the mortgage contract only up to its fair market
value of $23,500 plus any arrearages
incurred prior to the date they filed their
petition.
Relying on Section 506(a) of the
Bankruptcy Code, the Nobelmans classified the fair market value amount and
the arrearages as the secured portion of
their loan. They then stated that the
remainder of the bank loan, approximately $47,000, constituted the unsecured portion of the mortgage. Under
the Nobelmans' modified Chapter 13
plan, unsecured creditors would receive
nothing.
Section 506(a) of the Bankruptcy
Code defines a secured claim as "an
allowed claim of a creditor secured by
a lien on property in which the estate [in
this case, the Nobelmans] has an interest." However, a secured claim only
extends to the value of the creditors
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interest in the estate's interest in the
property. Under the Nobelman's proposal, this value is the fair market value
of the mortgage, totalling $23,500 plus
arrearages.
Furthermore, Section 506(a) defines
as unsecured claim as "[t]he extent of
the value of the creditor's interest ...
less the amount of the entire claim."
Under the circumstances in Nobelman,
American claimed $71, 335 as the debt.
The Nobelmans proposed $23,500 plus
arrearages as the amount of the secured
claim in their mortgage. Thus the unsecured portion of the Nobelman's mortgage would total approximately
$47,000, or $71,335 (American's total
claim) minus $23,500 plus arrearages
(secured claim).

Dispute Over Secured and Unsecured
Claims
Section 1322(b)(2) of the Bankruptcy Code allows debtors to adjust
their indebtedness through a flexible
repayment plan approved by a bankruptcy court. Under the plan, the debtor
must submit a portion of future earnings and income to a trustee who will
make payments to creditors for a period
of not more than five years. Section
1322(b)(2) also allows modification of
the rights of creditors holding secured
claims.
Nevertheless, Section
1322(b)(2) disallows modification in
specfic instances where (1) a creditor's
only security interest is that of the
debtor's principal residence; (2) creditors hold unsecured claims; or (3) creditors' rights of any class of claims is
unaffected.
The Nobelmans, American, and the
Chapter 13 trustee agreed that Section
1322(b)(2) prohibited modification of
a homestead lender's rights. However,
the parties argued whether dividing
American's claim into a secured claim
for $23,500 and a worthless unsecured
claim would modify the American's
rights as a homestead lender in violation of Section 1322(b)(2) of the Bankruptcy Code.
The Nobelmans asserted that their
Chapter 13 plan did not modify
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American's rights because Section
1322(b)(2) only applied to the extent
that the lender held a secured claim in
the debtor's residence. The Nobelmans
contended that the bank held a secured
claim of only $23,500, the value of the
property. Section 506(a) states that a
claim secured by a lien on the debtor's
property was a secured claim only to
the extent of the value of the property
and an unsecured claim to the extent
that it exceeded that value. The
Nobelmans claimed that the plan fell
within the limits of Section 1322(b)(2)
because it only modified the bank's
leftover unsecured claim.
CreditorsRights Protected
In rejecting the Nobelmans' plan,
the Supreme Court examined the language of Section 1322(b)(2) because it
focuses on creditors' rights, not on
claims. The Court agreed with the
Nobelmans that the portion of the bank's
claim which exceeded $23,000 was an
unsecured claim. However, the Court
concluded that the rights of the bank as
a lender under Section 1322(b)(2) were
not limited by the valuation of its secured claim.
Because the Bankruptcy Code does
not define creditors rights, the Court
looked to Texas law and the relevant
mortgage instruments enforceable under state law. Creditors' rights under
Texas law included: (1) the right to
repay the principal in monthly installments over a fixed term at specified
adjustable interest rates; (2) the right to
retain the lien until the debt was repaid;
(3) the right to accelerate the loan upon
default and to foreclose on the residence by public sale; and (4) the right to
bring an action to recover any deficiency remaining after foreclosure.
After reviewing Texas' interpretation
of creditors' rights, the Court held that
although the contractual rights of a home
mortgage lender were affected by the
borrower's Chapter 13 bankruptcy, the
rights bargained for by the borrower
and the lender were protected from
modification by Section 1322(b)(2).
The Supreme Court refused to follow the decisions of some appeals courts
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which had interpreted Section
1322(b)(2) as protecting only secured
claims. Nonetheless, the Court acknowledged that such an interpretation
was reasonable. The Court stated that
Congress chose to use the phrase "claim
secured by" in Section 1322(b)(2), instead of repeating the term of art "secured claim." The Court reasoned that
the word "claim" was broadly defined
in the Code as "any right to payment,"
whether secured or unsecured. In addition, the Court referred to Section 506(a)
which used the phrase "claim secured
by a lien" to encompass both the secured and unsecured portions of an
undersecured claim. Following this
analysis, the Court concluded that the
phrase "a claim secured by only a lien
on the debtor's home" referred to the
entire claim, including both the secured
and the unsecured portions of the claim.
The Supreme Court stated that this
interpretation was the most reasonable
because Section 1322(b)(2) would be
impossible to administer using the approach suggested by the Nobelmans.
The Nobelmans could not modify the
terms of the unsecured portion of their
loan without also modifying the secured portion. Preserving the interest
rate and the monthly payments specified in the note after reducing the principal to $23,500 would dramatically
reduce the term of the note. In addition,
the Court held that since the loan was an
adjustable rate mortgage, this fact alone
indicated that Section 1322(b)(2) could
not operate with Section 506(a) in the
manner suggested by the Nobelmans.
Neither the mortgage contract nor the
Bankruptcy Code suggested any basis
for recalculating the amortization schedule of adjustable rate mortgages.
As a result, the Supreme Court determined that dividing the undersecured
homestead lender's claim into its secured and unsecured parts would modify
the rights of the creditor whose claim
was secured only by a lien on the
debtor's home. In the Nobelman's case,
American's interest was only secured
by a lien on the Nobelman's home.
Thus, the Supreme Court could not allow the Nobelmans to divide their mort-

gage into secured and uns ecured parts
because such a bifurcation v ,ould clearly
violate Section 1322(b )(2) of the
Bankrupcty Code. *
Kathie Yoo

Title Company Must
Sustain Loss Cau sed By
Closing Attorney'sS Theft
of Mortgage Mone y
In Sears Mortgage Co rp. v. Rose,
1993 WL 283309 (N.J.), tIhe New Jersey Supreme Court found tIhat a closing
attorney retained by the pu rhasern af
real estate transaction was the agent of
the title insurance company in its dealings with the purchaser in effectuating
title insurance. According ly, the court
held that the title insuran e company
was liable for the closing Sattorney's
theft of money earmarked for the payment and satisfaction of an existing
first mortgage on the pro tperty. The
court also held that the titl e insurance
company breached its du ty of good
faith and fair dealing by fail ing to make
its insured aware that there was an insurable risk of attorney defaIlcation (the
failure of one entrusted witth money to
pay over when it is due to a nother) and
also by failing to expressly provide or
offer insurance coverage ft r that risk.
One Party Must Ultimatelty Bear the
Loss
In August 1987, Emery: Kaiser contracted to buy Michael Rosse's condominium. Kaiser provided thhe money to
buy the condominium by selling his
house. Kaiser retained Jose ph Gillen, a
real-estate attorney, to repreesent him in
both transactions. Gillen wr ote to Commonwealth Land Title Insurrance Company (Commonwealth) requ esting a title
insurance policy for Kaiser. Gillen also
wrote to Sears Mortgage Corporation
(Sears) requesting a mortg age payoff
statement on Rose's con dominium.
Commonwealth conducted a title search
and sent Gillen its title insu rance com-

mitment which listed Gillen as an "applicant" and Kaiser as the "proposed
insured." The commitment stated that
the policy would be subject to certain
requirements. Those requirements
were: payment of the purchase price to
the seller, payment of the premium for
the policy, proper signing of a proposed
deed from Rose to Kaiser, and that the
mortgage from Rose to Sears be "paid
and cancelled of record." Commonwealth only sent the policy to Gillen
despite the policy's language specifically directing it to the insured.
On October 17, 1987, on a form
provided by Commonwealth, Gillen
informed the insurance company that
the closing had taken place and asked it
to perform its final search and issue a
fee policy. Instead of sending Sears
funds to pay off Rose's mortgage, Gillen
misappropriated the closing funds from
the Rose-Kaiser transaction as well as
the closing funds from Kaiser's other
transactions. Gillen absconded with
the money and was later criminally
convicted, imprisoned, and disbarred.
The trial court held that Commonwealth was liable to Kaiser for breach
of its duty of good faith, fair dealing,
and full disclosure. The court also
found that Gillen had been
Commonwealth's agent in its dealings
with Kaiser and thus Commonwealth
would be liable for Gillen's misconduct under the law of agency. The court
ordered Commonwealth to pay off the
Sears' mortgage and to issue Kaiser an
owner's title-insurance policy free of
the Sears' mortgage encumbrance.
The appellate division reversed the
trial court's judgment. The appellate
division refused to impose liability on
Commonwealth because Kaiser's insurance policy did not include a provision protecting him from the risk of
attorney misappropriation of funds. The
Appellate Division also found that
Gillen
was
Kaiser's,
not
Commonwealth's agent.
The Supreme Court of New Jersey
reversed and reinstated the trial court's
judgment against Commonwealth. The
case turned on the specific relationships between the parties and their roles
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